The relationship of religion and Magic

Resolving the issue of the relationship between religion and magic is in some ways more difficult. By way of introduction, let us consider the concept of mana (a Polynesian term), which is common in “primitive” religions, and vestiges of which appear in the religious systems of industrial societies as well. Purnell Benson notes, for example, that mana appears in numerous religions under various names – in Hinduism it is darshan; in Christianity it is divine grace; among American Indians it was called manito by the Alqonquins, wakanda by the Sioux, orenda by the Iroquois, and maxpe by the Crow.
Mana is prime ingredient in magic. To those who believe in it there exists in the world, everywhere, and in everything, an elemental force, a primary energy – mana. Mana even exists – it floats, so to speak – in the very air we breathe. Often it is just there, not directly attached to anything, simply waiting to be grasped, harnessed, used. Though mana is in people, in things, in animals, in plants, and in the atmosphere, it is impotent until someone or something, or a spirit perhaps, activates it by discovering the secret key that unlocks its energies.
Enter magic, which attempts to exercise power over people and things by controlling the ubiquitous mana. The practice of magic is thus not an expression of ignorance, as is commonly supposed, but a conscious, deliberate attempt to circumvent what might normally be expected to occur. That is, magic is typically used to undercut the predictable by marshaling sufficient mana – elemental force – to change what otherwise would be inevitable.
In those societies where magic is most likely to be practiced and condoned (the more “primitive” societies), people make little if any distinction between magic and religion – or for that matter among scientific knowledge, religious knowledge, common-sense knowledge, and magic. Knowledge is knowledge, be it scientific, religious, or whatever. This lake of categories of course makes the task of distinguishing between magic and religion a bit more difficult.
We may begin, however, by noting the similarities and the differences or contrasts that have been suggested in the long debate over the relationship of religion and magic. First some similarities: (1) both are serious attempts to deal with and solve the basic problem people face; (2) both are based on faith in the existence and efficacy of powers that cannot be seen and can only be inferred by results; (3) both involve ritual activity, traditionally prescribed patterns of behavior; and (4) both are bona fide elements of the group’s large culture.
Some differences or contrasts follow: (1) religion more often centers on such overarching issues as salvation and the meaning of life and death, whereas magic is more likely to be employed in grappling with current, concrete problems (counteracting a viper’s bite, bringing rain, defeating the enemy, for example); (2) religion is more often future oriented, while magic is primarily concerned with the here-and-now (or at least the very near future); (3) religion’s orientation toward supernatural powers tends to be one of obeisance and supplication, involving sacrifice and prayer (such as asking the appropriate deity or spirit to act on one’s behalf), whereas magic is more manipulative, more often suggestive of pride than of humility (the magician seeks direct control over things and events, even at times seeking to trick the deity or defeat the deity in a contest if she or he can control enough mana); (4) religion is characteristically a group activity, with groups of people collectively engaged in rituals and worship, while magic is typically an individual affair – the magician against the world, so to speak. Of course it is important to recognize that the magician conducts his or her work within a group (the society), and that in a real sense it is the group that allows the magician to work. Thus even enough the magician works alone, her or his work is group sanctioned.
Are religion and magic, then, different phenomena, or two aspects of the same phenomenon? Or is one a subpart of the other? The last alternative is probably the most helpful way to see their relationship. Recalling our definition of religion, we find that magic fulfills each of our criteria – magic consists of beliefs and practices; it very clearly is concerned with the sacred and the supernatural; and it is practiced within a group (in a sense it is “possessed” by a group, although practiced by an individual). In fact, the relationship of magic to religion is virtually a classic example of specialization, for magic is typically practiced where the religious system considers it a legitimate and useful activity and encourages or at least allows its use. Thus magic is probably best seen neither as a competitor with religion nor as an alternative to it, but as a specialized subunit of religion. In fact, rarely is religion without at least some magical elements, just as magic is seldom practiced entirely apart frol a larger religious system that legitimates it.
Final reflection on the definition of religion
As the readers reflect a moment on our attention in this chapter to the task of defining religion, they might sense some ambivalence. If so, we3 have achieved one of our purposes in this chapter. Frankly, as we write this text, we face a dilemma which cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all. The dilemma resides in the recognition that (1) our definition of religion (the six characteristics) is not inclusive of all phenomena that may in some sense be “religious,” and it tends to be “conservative” in the sense that the focus is inevitably upon what has been traditionally recognized as religious – the religious institution in society; and (2) that such traditional institutional forms of religion do happen to be a prominent feature of societies and as such merit analysis had understanding.
Thus we have opted in this introductory text to concentrate on what is commonly regarded as religion and seems to fall fairly cleanly within our definition (a fantastically broad array of data and developments as it is). But we recognize and draw attention to the fact that there is likely more that can legitimately be called religion than this. Thus, in one sense we conclude this chapter deliberately leaving the issue of defining religion somewhat open-ended. Yet we also proceed from a close-ended approach as we pragmatically attempt to cover a manageable subject. That is, we will spend most of our time in this text discussing religion as included in our definition. But we strongly assert that when the discussions is ended, we will only have begun to talk about what could have been included from other perspectives or definitions.
A Concluding Historical Note: The Development of The Sociology of Religion
A clearly identifiable interest in a formalized sociological study of religion goes back barely ahundred years, roughly coincident with the beginning of formalized sociology in general near the midpoint of the last century. The stimulus for sociological interest in religion seems to have been the reports of anthropologists during the early and middle nineteenth century who encountered and studied “primitive” societies in Africa and Oceania. Two significant observations made by these social scientists were (1) the existence everywhere of some form of religion, and (2) the fascinatingly wide variety of religious forms and behaviors. In other words, religion was observed to be as diverse as it was widespread.
Such had always been true, of course. But as long as societies remained relatively isolated, the diversity and universality of religion was not fully appreciated. The advent of European colonialism and the consequent increase in the world trade and commercial interaction after the Middle Ages raised the frequency and intensity of intersocietal contacts and eventually led to ethnographical investigations by social scientists. As a result more and more people began taking an interest in understanding and explaining the worldwide diversity of religion.
Following the initial flurry of social scientists’ interest in religion (initiated by early anthropologists), sociological interest in and research on religion, with a few notable exceptions, lay somewhat dormant until fairly recently. David Moberg has suggested several reasons for this: (1) some sociologists, discouraged by the close historical association of religion with philosophy and metaphysics, decided that religion that could not be fruitfully studied empirically; (2) other sincerely interested sociologists yielded to the opposition against sociological research on the religion that came from many religious groups; (3) those teaching in state universities were fearful of jeopardizing their positions if they should somehow overstep the boundary separating church and state; (4) others, convinced that religion was definitely on its way to extinction anyway, preferred not to waste their time; (5) still others who had personally rejected religion were reluctant to maintain any contact with it – even if only of a research nature.
The notable exceptions included some of the early sociological giants, such as Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber, who devoted a significant portion of their scholarly energies to analyzing the role of religion in society. After Weber’s publication of his sociology of religion in 1921, however, little research for theoretical development occurred in the sociology of religion until after World War II, when there was a dramatic upsurge in religious activity, particularly in the United States. Significant increases in church membership and attendance at religious services, extensive building programs, and the establishment of hundreds of new congregations each year engendered serious talk of a religious revival.
Sociologists became interested. Here was a social phenomenon to explore and explain, a development that was particularly intriguing in that many social scientists had long been predicting the eventual and even precipitous demise of religion, particularly in its institutional form. The sociologists’ new research interest in religion, which began in the late 1940s and early 1950s, has continued essentially unabated to the present. One reason for this is that these new developments in religion, which clamor for investigation and explanation, have continued at a rapid pace. Furthermore, the persistence of religion in its various forms has finally forced sociologists to renew the effort, initiated by early fathers of sociology like Durkheim and Weber, of attempting to understand the nature and function of religion. For both these reasons this book concentrates on systematizing sociological research and theoretical efforts that have appeared during the past twenty years or so – not because the newest efforts are necessarily the best ones, but simply because most of the empirical work in the field is relatively recent vintage. Indeed, it appears that social scientists are beginning to fulfill in part the prophecy of the anthropologist James Frazer, who predicated a half-century ago that the time would come when the religions of the world would no longer be regarded in terms of their truth or falsehood, but simply as phenomena to be studied like any other expression of humanity.