The sociological perspective

Religion is a social phenomenon and is in an interactive relationship with the other social units that constitute a society. This seemingly obvious assertion, which lies at the very foundation of the sociology of religion, is actually not nearly as simple as it may seem. Nor is it si readily accepted as one might expect.
Many people, particularly the religiously committed, think of religion in an entirely different way some prefer to see religion as the context of people’s communion with the supranatural, and religious experience as something ourside of ordinary experience, while others see religion as an expression of an instinctual reaction of cosmic forces. Still others see religion as an explicit set of messages from a deity. These viewpoints certainly de-emphasize, ignore, or even reject the sociological dimensions of religion. Nevertheless, whether we are talking about religion in general, or a particular religious family such as Chiristianity or Buddhism, or a specific religious group such as the First Baptist, religion will be seen to interact with other social institutions and forces in society and will follow and illustrate sociological principles and law.
In other words, whatever else it is (or is not), religion is a social phenomenon and such is in a continual reciprocal, interactive relationship with other social phenomena. That, in brief, is what the sociology of religion is all about; and this book is concerned with the specification and elaboration of this point in a variety of dimensions and on a number of levels.
Characteristics of the sociology of religion
Asserting that religion is a social phenomenon suggest several things. In the first place the statement has a nonevaluative intent. Thus we are not going to be able to, or even want to. Speak about the truth or falsity of religion. Speaking of religion in terms of the good, the true, and the beautiful may be worthwhile and even stimulating for philosophers and theologians-or anyone, for that matter (even sociologists); but such as considerations have nothing to do with sociology. Sociology that claims to describe reality accurately demands that its practioners approach their subjects-religion no less than any other (and perhaps more than most)- with all the neutrality and objectivity they can muster.
Of course, no sociologist can always (if ever) be perfectly neutral and objective with regard to his or her subject, let alone one so value laden and emotionally charged as religion. Recent studies in the sociology of knowledge, as well as honest discussions that have punctured the myth of a “value free” sociology, have been sufficient to discourage any such pretentions. Nonetheless, a conscious, deliberate striving for neutrality and objectivity must be present-indeed, it should be evident-in any sociological investigation.
The sociology of religion is also empirical – it can only study and reach conclusions about phenomena that are observable. In order to confirm or refute any particular theory, the sociologist must test that theory with relevant empirical observation, or data. And since data are by their nature limited to the observable, the measurable, the quantifiable, whatever elements of religion are spiritual or supernatural, in the sense that they cannot be seen with the eye or otherwise measured or recorded, are by definition beyond the purview of sociology.
Our characterization of sociology of religion so far, as objective and empirical, can be summed up by stating that the sociology of religion is conducted according to the scientific method. By the scientific method we mean (1) the systematic search for verifiable data “facts” firmly rooted in prior knowledge and theoretical formulation; (2) the production of evidence as opposed to hearsay, opinion, intuition, or common sense; and (3) the following of procedures that others can verify and replicate (reproduce under essentially identical condition).
It is at this point that the sociologist of religion encounters probably the most strenuous objection from the religion primarily to the supernatural – that is, to forces that are usually unseen - and involves matters of the hearts as well, anything the sociologist can say about religion, limited as he or she is to describing the observable, will be at best superficial and unimportant, at worst false and misleading. J. Milton Yinger has supplied some useful imagery in speaking to this issue. He frames the objection to the empirical study of religion with the question. “how is it possible to see a stained-glass window from the outside?” that is, the beauty and the message or picture of a church’s stained-glass window is visible only when one is inside and can see the sunlight shining through. Professor Yinger suggesting begoes on to note, howevee, that the view from inside constitutes only part of what can be learned about the window. Only from the outside, for example, can the viewer appreciate the exterior framework or context within which that window exist. Furthermore, there are, as Yinger suggest, pieces of information potentially important to understanding the significance of the window that have nothing to do with viewing it from the inside (or from the outside, for that matter): who built it, who installed it, who provides for its repairs, who goes in to view it from the inside. We can also consider the reason it was installed, what “outsiders” think of it, how it resembles or differs from other windows, whether the style of newer windows is the same or is changing and so on.
Rather than belabor the obvious parallel that we are suggesting between this situation and the study of religion, it is enough to note that question like these can be answered empirically, that they are important questions, and that the answer to them amplify our understanding. Granted, empirical data do note constitute the only information of any importance about religion. Nor can we claim that empirical or observable measures of religion reveal its “essence”. Studying religion empirically places a certain restriction on our enterprise, but no more severe a restriction than is placed on the position of those who claim religion to be strictly concerned with spiritual matters and therefore off-limits to empirical investigation. Each “side” of this issue can contribute to an understanding of the total phenomenon.
Central sociological assumptions
Having established that the scientific study of religion is a legitimate endeavor, it remains for us to indicate why, for the sociologist, it is an important one – that is, hoe it furthers sociology’s task of understanding the dynamics of people living in groups. For this purpose it will be helpful to identify some of central assumptions of sociology, whether applied to the study of religion, the family, the class system, or any other social phenomenon.
The sociological perspective
In the first place, what exactly is sociology? Very briefly stated, sociology is the study of the interaction of people in groups and of the influence of those groups on human behavior generally and on society’s other institutions and groups. Thus sociology has a rwofold goal: (1) understanding the dynamics of group life – what groups are, how they function, how they change, how they differ from one other; and (2) understanding the influence of groups on individual and collective behavior. One fundamental assumption of sociology implied by this is that all human activity us influenced by groups. Throughout a person’s lifetime groups impinge on her or his biological “raw material,” shaping it, modifying it, influencing it – socializing it, to use the sociologist term. This process begins with the family and proceeds through the hundreds of educational, associational, peer, and work groups that a person participates in and has contact with throughout his or her lifetime.
In both fundamental sense of the sociological enterprise – explaining group dynamics and explaining group influence – religion qualifies perfectly as a field of sociology study and analysis. Leaving aside for now the question of whether religion is also (or even primarily) an individual phenomenon, it is obviously at least a group phenomenon. Thus to the extent that religions organize themselves into groups – congregations, denominations, dioceses, cells, fellowships, and so on. – an important task for sociology is the study of the structure and functioning of these groups simply as groups. In other words, we want to determine how and to what extent religious groups follow sociological laws governing group life in general. In that ways does a congregations, for example, operate like any other voluntary association – like, say, the League of Women Voters? Or how and to what degree do major religious denominations function like other large bureaucracies – like, say, General Motors or the United States Army?.
Insofar as religion is organized into groups, it exerts influence not only on its members, but also on nonmembers and on other groups and institutions. The second dimension of our preliminaty definition of sociology – as a study of group influence – thus suggest that religious groups that center around one’s family, peers, or workplace. The question is not so much whether such influence exists but to what degree, in what ways, and how it can be measured.
Human nature
A number of assumption in sociology center around the definition of human nature. Here we shall emphasize three of these assumptions.
First, and perhaps most obviously, a human being is a biological organism – a creature with physiological drivers, needs, potentials, and limitations. The socializing influence of groups is thus both directed at and limited by biological factors. Religion is of course among those socializing agents that attempt to influence or modify biological nature. For example, different religious groups have different approaches to, and provide or allow different outlets for, sexual drives. And insofar as people in fact internalize these different emphases – whether they be permissive, compensatory, restrictive, or whatever – to that extent people will have different personalities and evidence rejects notions of biological determinism, it recognizes as openly as possible that human being has potentialities and limitations that are biological provided.
Another sociological assumption regarding human nature that is worth mentioning is the apparently unique ability of people to symbol. By this we mean the ability arbitrarily to attach specific meanings to things, sounds, words, acts, - meanings that are not intrinsic to the items themselves but that people have created. By establishing consensus on these meanings, groups are able to communicate and to accumulate knowledge. Using language as the prime symbolic mechanism, people can deal with abstract concepts and emotions, such as love, justice, and equality as easily as they can ask someone to pass the potatoes at the dinner table.
The ability to express meanings symbolically is primarily responsible for the variety of groups, cultures, ideologies, and technologies throughout history. There is no activity in which people are engaged that does not involves acts of symbolizing – whether lecturing, voting, making love, or “being religious.” Religion in fact consists entirely of symbols and of activities that are interpreted and mediated by symbols. This is true whether the symbols have empirical referents or not. God, hell, salvation, Star of David, nirvana, guru, mana – all have meaning to those initiated into particular symbolic system. The meaning of each of these is not inherent in the word itself or in the combination of sounds, but it supplied by the believer. Even it divine truths have been expressed in human language, or are immediately translated into human language – otherwise the message would have no meaning for people.
Yet other primary sociological assumption about human nature is that people become human only in groups – admittedly, a dramatic way of stating that the influence of groups on the human organism through socialization is crucial and far-reaching. We do not propose to debate the academic question of whether the newborn baby is in fact human. The point is simply that the newborn infant is not yet very much of what it is going to become, and that what it does become will be largely attributable to socializing influences. One of those socializing influences is religion, whish in fact affects everyone, whether or not they are born into a “religious” family or attend Sunday school or are married by a member of the clergy, and so on. For religion also exerts an indirect influence on people, if only in an inverse way as a negative reference group or through its influence on secular institutions.
Human action is directed toward problem solving
A fundamental assumption of sociology is that every human action is in some form and to some degree a problem-solving act or mechanism. Whether working at a job, getting married, planning a party, or genuflecting, the human being is engaged in the process of solving or resolving some existing (present) or anticipated (future) problem. The problem may be how to satisfy a biological need for nourishment, how to achieve victory on the athletic field, or how to get God to help you pass an exam this afternoon. In any case, the person perceives a problem that she or he must solve, either now or, if he or she fails to take appropriate action, in the future.
Religious behavior is problem-solving like any other social activity. Praying, attending church services, observing religious laws, and having and talking about “mountaintop experience,” for example, are all religious activities that contribute in some way (at least from the perspective of the religious participant) toward solving a problem, either existing or anticipated. Note that we are not suggesting (or denying) that religion in fact either solves problems or creates them. Rather, our point is that people often engage in religious activities in the belief that such behavior can solve problems. Lest there be any misunderstanding, once again we will emphasize that throughout this book no attempt is made to determine or question the truth or falsity, the efficacy or inefficacy, of religion in general, of any specific religion in particular, or of anyone’s personal religious beliefs. Engaged we are in sociological investigation, we are concerned solely with that can be observed, including what people believe exists and happens.
All social phenomena are interrelated
The final sociological assumption that we need to clarify before delving in detail into the sociology of religion is that all social phenomena within a given group or society are interrelated. That is, all social phenomena are continually interacting, and every part becomes linked with every other in at least an indirect way. More specifically, part A may not be influence through a chain of other factors or social phenomena called B, C, D, and E. most important for our purposes, religion interacts with – is in a dynamic reciprocal relationship with – every other social phenomenon and process. Religion both influences them and is influenced by them; religion both acts and reacts, is both independent variable and dependent variable, both cause and effect. This principles of the continual dialectic involving religion and other social phenomena is a central theme of this book, for determining the nature and extent of these mutual influences are key tasks in the sociology of religion.
We have now identified in at least an introductory way what sociology is. Now, what is religion – the second term in our subject, the sociology of religion?
A sociological definition of religion
Everyone of course “knows” what religion is. For our purposes, however, such knowledge needs to be systematized. We need to achieve some consensus on the boundaries of our subject matter, which we all recognize as having great diversity, before we can proceed to analyze it. Without denying the validity of any individual’s private definition, we need to establish some ground rules that we can follow throughout this text. Clearly there is nothing absolute about a definition – no definition, of any phenomenon, religion included, is inherent in the phenomenon itself. What we require, then, is a working definition of religion – specially, a definition that we can be fairly sure includes the major ideas of this concept, a definition that is moreover flexible and responsive to changing conditions and new evidence – so that we can communicate fairly sensibly not include everything that anyone has ever thought religion might be, we will try to isolate the core or essential elements.
The characteristics of religion
The English word religion has a Latin root; that much is certain. But there is disagreement over whether the Latin root word is religare, meaning “to bind together” (suggesting possibly the concept of a group or fellowship) or relegere, meaning “to rehearse, to execute painstakingly,” referring probably to the repetitious nature of liturgy. Either word makes sense as a root, and each taps a dimension of religion that we will include in our definition. Yet it is clear that etymology by itself will not provide us with an ultimate answer to our problem of definition.
Religion is a group phenomenon
Let us start with the concept suggested by the Latin word religare – the concept of the group or fellowship. The assertion that is a group phenomenon is significant both for what it says and for what it fails to say, for what it excludes. What it excludes is of course the individual aspect. Certainly religion is an individual matter in any number if ways: in that it involves personal emotions and thoughts; or insofar as one’s religion is a matter of personal beliefs; or insofar individuals are free to commit themselves to whichever religious system they prefer. Still, it would not make sense to expect that one could somehow systematically study every individual’s personal religious beliefs. Sociology, being committed to systematic study of group behavior, has no such problem in that it concentrates on the group dimension of religion.
Throughout history and in every corner of the world, people have engaged in religious behavior. Congregations, ceremonial gatherings, denominations, prayer meetings, family pilgrimages, ecumenical councils – all are examples of religious activity. Even when a lone figure is acknowledge to have experienced visions or received supernatural dispensations, she or he frequently attracts others – that is, he or she becomes leader (perhaps even a prophet) with a following, often whether the person seeks it or not. True, we also see occasional isolated by mystics and religious hermits in mountaintop seclusion. Even most of these, however, belong to some subgroup of a major religion (such as Catholicism or Buddhism), which may encourage or even structure and coordinate such activity.
Elaborating our admittedly arbitrary division of religion into its personal and group dimensions, J Paul Williams suggests that there are at least four types or levels of religiousness: (1)the secret level, which person keeps to himself or herself and does not divulge or discusses;
(2) the private, which she or he divulges or discusses with only a few carefully chosen intimates ; (3) the denominational, which the individual shares with many others in a large group; and
(4) the societal, which the person shares with the members of society at large. William’s first to categories will occupy very little of our time-not because they fail to involve religion ( they obviously do), but simply because of the reasons already mentioned for narrowing our range of coverage, and also, to some extent, because solid sociological research into individual aspects of religion has only recently begun. For example, chapter 4, while it does not deal with precisely what William means by “ secret “ religiousness, focuses on what we might call the social-psychological dimension of religion-the process of individual internalization of religion. Our primary attention, however, will be on what Williams identifies as denominational and societal religion, with particular emphasis on the former, again reflecting the fact that most research in the sociology of religion has been in this area.
So much for what is excluded by our characterization of religion as a group phenomenon. Now we may ask, what is included in this aspect of our definition? Answering this question requires that we specify exactly what a group is; in this regard, fortunately, sociologists are very explicit.
According to one definition that most sociologists would accept, a group has six major features. The first and most basic is that a group is composed of two more people (members) who have established certain patterns of interaction (including communication) with one another. Such interaction does not necessarily take place continually, or even daily. Nor those every member of a group interact with every other member. Nor is this interaction necessarily face to face. The point is simply that the people who constitute a group – group members – are aware of one of one another (perhaps can know one another) and have established patterns of interaction characteristic of their group.
The second major of a group, according to our definition, is that group members share certain common goals – in fact, this is the reason they came together in the first place (although they may not have known it then). The process of forming a group thus involves the fundamental sociological concept, introduced earlier in this chapter, that all human behavior consist of some sort of problem-solving activity. Saying that a group has common goals implies that individuals who are confronted with common problems have made contact and have agreed to work together reward the goal of solving those problems. Imagine, for example, five individuals, each deeply concerned about industrial-waste pollution in a certain trout stream, who through casual conversation (perhaps whole trying to fish the stream) “discover” one another and subsequently form a group called STEP (save Trout From Environmental Pollution), whose primary goal is reducing pollution in this and other trout streams. Thus what was originally the separate concern of five individuals has become a group concern, which in turn implies a certain common goals that they share with one another.
Third, as a result of the above, a group is guided by shared norms. For once a group defines its goals, it then determines how to reach them; that is, the group specifies that such and such it what its member will do, as well as when, where, and how. All such specifications are norms – more or less formal expectations concerning appropriate behavior by one or all members of the group.
Fourth, every group member has a role, or ser of functions, to fulfill. As such, a role consists of a set of specific norms the group wants carried out. The development of different roles within the group gives rise to what is known as the division of labor. Thus, whenever a member leaves the group or adopts a new role, the group may need to keep the division of labor in balance by recruiting someone else – either another member or an outsider – for that particular role.
Fifth, a group functions collectively in accordance with a status system, a hierarchy in which different amounts of power, authority, and prestige are accorded to different roles and to the individuals in them. Different groups, of course, have different criteria for establishing status rankings. Roles involving group coordination, decision making, and interpretation, for example, which inherently carry the greatest authority and prestige, are often assigned to those individuals who are believed to perform these tasks most ably, although such other factors as seniority, wealth, and kinship can also be influential.
Sixth, group members feel and express a sense of identification with the group: “I belong,” “This Is My Group,” “Yes, I’m an active member of STEP.” The degree of group commitment, dedication, and identification varies from member to member, and most groups are able to tolerate some such variability. But without a certain minimum amount of identification and commitment on the part of its members, a group will soon disintegrate.
These six characteristic features of a group obviously apply to religious groups no less than to any other kind. Thus in studying religion as a group phenomenon, we already know many things to expect and even some questions to ask: How does a given religious group differ from all others in terms of these six aspects? What, for example, are the religious group’s goals, its norms, its roles, its status criteria?
Religion is concerned with the sacred and supernatural
A second characteristic that we wish to include in our definition of religion is its involvement with what Durkheim identified as the “sacred,” with what Rudolf Otto termed the “holy” or the “wholly other,” and essentially what Mircea Eliade refers to as “sacred space” that is qualitatively different from all other “homogenous” space in which regular, every day occurrences and activities take place. There is universal tendency for religion to express awe, reverence, and fear with regard to certain things, being or situations and to distinguish them from the ordinary, the mundane – or, as Durkheim defines it, the “profane.” Old Testament Jews removed their sandals upon entering the temple, many Christians make the sign of the cross when praying to God, Hindus give cows the right of way, Muslims undertake pilgrimages to Mecca, American Indians avoided disturbing holy plots of ground. All such behavior express the recognition of a sacred place or situation. In each instance people acknowledge being in the presence of something special – something above and beyond them that demands adopting special attitudes, performing certain actions, and perhaps articulating special words as well.
For many people – for whole religious systems, for that matter – that “something special,” the sacred, in fact involves the supernatural, a power or being no subject to the laws of the observable universe. Such a power may be personified by Jesus, by Vishnu, by Allah, or by any number of gods, devils, goblins, or spirits. Or perhaps it is simply a vague and diffuse power, such as that identified by the Polynesian term mana (which we shall discuss shortly).
In these beliefs a dichotomy of reality is being expressed. On the one hand there are the “profane” (ordinary) events and the visible environment of the routine workday world. On the other hand there is the invisible largely uncontrollable, out of the ordinary realm. To a greater or lesser degree, people can control and predict familiar everyday situations – the choice of daily tasks, conversations with others, the acts of eating and copulating, the seeking of nightly rest, and so on. But most people seem to believe that there is no more to life than such ordinary situations and events. What about the big bang in the sky last week and the twisting dagger of light that preceded it? What about my friend who dropped dead while running beside me? What about the place in the swamp where a whole hunting party was swallowed up in the mud? Such things are out of the ordinary; they cannot be taken for granted; they elicit fear, awe, respect. We are here in the presence of Otto’s “wholly other” – an entirely different order of existence.
It should be emphasized that the experiences that people define as sacred vary considerably and the objects of their awe and reverence are infinitely diverse. Yet every society has its list of such awesome and mysterious things and events. Religion deals with them. Religion provides explanations and answers; religion prescribes methods of placation and of expressing appropriate reverence. The sacred, the holy, the supernatural, together with people’s relationship to them, thus constitute the prime subject matter of religion.
Although the term sacred may occasionally connote little more than “deserving or demanding respect,” with no necessary thought of a supernatural power being involved, it is usual for the two concepts to go together. That which is considered sacred is so precisely because some supernatural forces or activity arouses the feeling of awe that surrounds the sacred object, person, place, or situation. While they are not strictly synonymous concepts, the sacred and the supernatural are in most societies so intimately related that most of the time we shall regard them as almost inseparable for the purposes of our definition of religion.
However, in the interests of precision and clarity of the concepts sacred and supernatural, we shall regard only the sacred only the sacred as essential to religion. This allows us to include several thought system that most people would almost intuitively think of as religious systems, yet upon close examination are found to express no concept of the supernatural at all. We would mention as examples Jainism, Ethical Culture, early Buddhism, and early Confucianism.
Religion involves a Body of beliefs
A third characteristic of religion, one that is much more straightforward and easy to describe, is that it invariably includes or implies a body of beliefs. This characteristic proceeds directly from the foregoing considerations of the sacred and the supernatural. For in the act of endeavoring to deal with or justify these phenomena and experiences, religious groups develop explanations, work out rationales, and discover “facts” that are eventually systematized into a body of beliefs.
Every major religion has its sacred book or books that spell out or at least provide the basis for determining the beliefs the group holds. Some examples are the Bible, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, and the Bhagavad-Gita. Furthermore, every major religion has beliefs in addition to those contained in such “official” or basic writings – the interpretations and extensions of lesser prophets and of other successors to the founder (s) of the religion, for example. Then, too, there is in every religion (and not just in those of preliterate societies) the oral tradition – unwritten explanation, in the form of myths, sagas, and proverbs, handed down to each new generation by word of mouth.
Borhek and Curtis describe seven features of most belief systems. First, there are values – definitions of what is good or valuable; second, criteria of validity by which to judge new observations and messages; third, a “logic” that relates one substantive element in the belief system to others fourth, a perspective that identifies how the group stands in relation to other groups and world views; fifth, substantive beliefs such as “Jesus will come again to reign a thousand years” or “Vishnu is an avatar of the Buddha,” sixth, prescriptions and proscriptions so far as behavior is concerned; seventh, a technology that consist of means and techniques for obtaining valued goals.
It should be pointed out that we are dealing here with a characteristic that is not unique to religious groups, for groups of all kinds have belief systems. Although we can view beliefs as attitudes or opinions so far as the individual concerned, group beliefs properly fall under the heading of the norms established or accepted by the group. Norms, in other words, specify not only how a group’s members are expected to behave but also what they are expected to believe, how they are to interpret and relate to things and events. The distinctiveness of religious groups so far as beliefs and norms are concerned rests simply with the subject matter of those beliefs. The beliefs of religious groups specifically concern the sacred and very likely also the supernatural.
Religion involves a set of practices
A fourth characteristic of religion is that it universally involves specific practices, which consist of acting out certain normative expectations. One of the most obvious features of any religion – obvious because it consist of